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We investigate the effect of social interactions on labor market outcomes using  a 
direct measure of social contacts based on information about individuals’ three best 
friends and their characteristics. We examine the effect of the number of employed 
friends  on  the  transition  from  non-employment  to  employment,  and  we  find  the 
existence  of  significant  network  effects  at  the  individual  level.  An  additional 
employed friend increases the probability of finding a job by 3.7 percentage points. 
This  finding  is  robust  to  specifications  that  address  the  endogeneity  of  friends’ 
employment status, which may be induced by correlation with unobserved individual 
attributes and feedback effects. Considering labor market outcomes, we find evidence 
of  higher  wages  and  employment  stability  for  those  with  more  employed  friends, 
which is consistent with networks acting as an information transmission mechanism. 
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1. Introduction 
Search in the labor market involves the acquisition of information about available job 
opportunities, which requires time and  effort. Social networks have for long been 
considered as an important source of information for job seekers (see e.g. Rees, 1966; 
Montgomery,  1991  in  economics;  and  Granovetter,  1995;  Petersen  et  al.,  2010  in 
sociology). A number of early studies have documented the widespread use of friends 
and  relatives  as  a  job  search  method  (see  Montgomery,  1991  and  Ioannides  and 
Loury,  2004  for  reviews).  Recent  studies  have  looked  at  the  effect  of  social 
interactions on employment and wages using indirect measures, such as geographical 
proximity or group affiliation, to define the relevant social network (e.g. Topa, 2001; 
Munshi, 2003; Weinberg et al., 2004; Bayer et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2010).
1 
In this paper, we investigate the importance of network effects in the labor 
market using direct information on social interactions. We develop a measure of the 
relevant social network of each individual which is based on information from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) about each of the respondent’s three best 
friends and their characteristics. Using this information, we can construct a measure 
of the quality of the network based on the employment status of the friends. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses direct information on social 
interactions in estimating the effect of networks on labor market outcomes. Unlike 
previous research, we do not rely on the identification assumption that individuals 
within a given group – e.g. neighborhood or firm – actually know each other and are 
members  of  the  same  network,  which  is  non-testable.  The  focus  of  our  empirical 
analysis is to identify the effect of the number of employed friends on job finding 
rates based on the transition from non-employment to employment across two years. 
                                                            
1 Ioannides and Topa (2010) review the recent literature on social interactions and job matching based 
on neighborhood effects.   2 
Due to the panel structure of our data, the measure of network quality – the number of 
employed friends – is predetermined at the time of the observed transition, which 
avoids the reflection problem (Manski, 1993). 
The motivation behind using the number of employed friends as a measure of 
the quality of the social network is that employed social contacts are expected to be 
better  informed  about  job  opportunities  available  in  the  market  and  to  pass  this 
information  to  non-employed  network  members.  The  better,  therefore,  the 
employment  status  of  an  agent’s  connections,  the  more  likely that is the agent to 
receive  information  about  employment  opportunities.  This  leads  to  a  positive 
correlation between the employment status of the agents in a network. Our analysis, 
therefore, offers direct evidence to theoretical work which examines the implications 
of  networks  on  employment  dynamics  (Montgomery,  1991;  Calvó-Armengol  and 
Jackson, 2004; Bramoullé and Saint-Paul, 2009). 
Identification  of  social  network  effects  is  complicated  for  a  number  of 
reasons.
2 First, any effect of the number of employed friends on job finding rates 
might  be  due  to  the  presence  of  correlated  unobservables.  Unobserved  individual 
attributes can be correlated between an individual and his or her contacts because of 
positive  sorting.  For  instance,  more  able  and  motivated  individuals  have  better 
employment  prospects  and  are  more  likely  to  have  employed  friends.  Generally, 
social  interactions  are  more  likely  to  emerge  among  individuals  that  share  some 
relevant traits – such as education or ethnicity – or are characterized by similar tastes 
or constraints.
3 When these traits and tastes are unobservable to the researcher and 
correlated with the outcomes of interest the estimated effect will be biased and cannot 
                                                            
2 The identification of social interactions is discussed by Manski (1993, 2000), Moffitt (2001), 
Bramoullé et al. (2009) and in the comprehensive review by Blume et al. (2010).   3 
be  attributed  to  a  network  effect.  Our  identification  strategy  exploits  the  panel 
dimension of our data, which provides variation in the employment status of friends 
and  the  outcomes  for  a  given  individual  over  time.  This  allows  us  to  control  for 
individual fixed effects. The main identification assumption is that any correlation 
between the number of employed friends and individual unobserved traits is due to 
traits that do not vary over time. This assumption rules out any correlation due to 
time-varying unobserved attributes. We investigate the sensitivity of our results to the 
inclusion of time-varying observed heterogeneity, and we show that our findings are 
robust. Correlation in unobservables may also arise because of the presence of local 
economic shocks (e.g. a plant closing in the local area) that affect both the individual 
and his or her friends. We address this issue by controlling for the local economic 
conditions using the unemployment rates in the travel-to-work area.  
The second complication in the estimation of the network effects is that the 
composition and quality of the network might change in response to individual’s labor 
market status. This feedback from being non-employed to the number of employed 
friends might arise if, for instance, staying longer out of employment leads to fewer 
contacts with those employed. We provide evidence that our findings are robust to the 
existence of an endogenous network and, if anything, they can be seen as a lower 
bound.  
Our  results  indicate  the  existence  of  significant  network  effects  at  the 
individual level. An additional employed friend increases the probability to find a job 
by 3.7 percentage points. In addition, the job-finding rate increases with the number 
of  employed  friends,  with  individuals  being  11  percentage  points  more  likely  to 
become employed when they have three employed friends than having none. We also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 For a model of friendship formation stressing the role of ‘types’ similarities, see Currarini et al. 
(2009). An empirical investigation of friendship formation is provided by Marmaros and Sacerdote   4 
find that an additional employed friend among those who find a job is associated with 
a  6.2  percent  increase  in  wages  and  a  reduction  in  the  probability  to  exit  from 
subsequent  employment  of  5.1  percentage  points.  We  interpret  these  additional 
findings as suggestive evidence of networks operating as information transmission 
mechanisms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how 
this paper is related to the social network theories of the labor market and the existing 
empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. We report 
the  main  results  in  Section  4,  discuss  our  findings  in  relation  to  the  potential 
mechanisms that can explain network effects in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Literature 
The analysis in this paper offers direct empirical evidence on the role of employed 
contacts  on  job  finding  probabilities.  A  number  of  theoretical  contributions  have 
modeled the impact of social interactions on employment transitions. These studies 
emphasize  the  role  of  the  employment  status  of  the  contacts  in  the  network 
(Montgomery,  1991;  Calvó-Armengol,  2004;  Calvó-Armengol  and  Jackson,  2004; 
Bramoullé and Saint-Paul, 2009; Galeotti and Merlino, 2010).
4 Employed network 
members receive information about vacancies which they do not need for themselves 
and pass on to their unemployed contacts; they may  be  generally  better informed 
about employment opportunities available in the market; or they may directly provide 
job referrals to employers. All these mechanisms imply a transmission of information 
between employed and unemployed network members that is beneficial to the job 
search  process  of  the  latter.  Therefore,  the  core  prediction  from  the  theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(2006).  
4 Ioannides and Loury (2004) provide a comprehensive review of the literature.   5 
literature is that the better the employment status of an individual’s connections, the 
more likely he or she is to receive information about jobs, which leads to a positive 
correlation between the employment status of connected individuals in a network.  
Our work relates to the growing empirical literature that tries to identify the 
labor market effects of social networks. A major challenge for most studies is the 
definition of the network due to the lack of information on social interactions.
5 One 
stream of literature relies on self-reported information about the use of contacts while 
searching for a job (see Loury, 2006 and Pellizzari, 2010 for recent examples in the 
literature). In this case, researchers have information on the existence of social ties, 
but typically do not observe the quality of such ties (in particular their employment 
status), which is key in testing the predictions of theoretical models. Moreover, the 
effect of informal contacts may stem from improvement in match quality or from 
selection effects of workers with limited access to alternative search channels. 
Alternatively, research strategies based on geographical proximity and group 
affiliation have been proposed. A common trait of these studies is that in the absence 
of  direct  information  on  social  ties,  networks  are  assumed  to  operate  along  some 
observable dimensions, such as the neighborhood or the firm. Practically, researchers 
generate clusters of agents based on group membership and assume that individuals 
know  each  other  within  these  groups.  Examples  of  studies  that  use  geographic 
proximity  at  the  neighborhood  level  to  define  networks  include  Topa  (2001), 
Weinberg et al. (2004), Bayer et al. (2008), Hellerstein et al. (2008) and Schmutte 
                                                            
5 Data on actual links within a network have been recently used by Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) to 
study educational outcomes. Using the US Add Health survey, they are able to construct complete 
network of friends in high schools and are then able to relate network characteristics to measures of 
educational success, separating network from peer effects.    6 
(2010). These studies find significant effects of networks on employment and wages.
6 
Studies that define networks based on group affiliation include Cingano and Rosolia 
(2006),  who  use  data  from  the  Italian  social  security  archive  and  define  contact 
networks at the firm level as the set of individuals who had been working together 
prior  to  displacement,  Dustmann  et  al.  (2010)  who  use  German  linked  employer-
employee data to study ethnicity based job referral networks, and Munshi (2003) who 
defines  networks  at  the  origin-community  level  to  identify  job  networks  among 
Mexican migrant in the U.S. labor market. 
Finally, another empirical strategy relies on family networks identified from 
population-wide employer-employee data set. Kramarz and Nordström Skans (2009) 
study the school-to-work transitions of young Swedish and find that job referrals from 
parents  are  indeed  very  frequent,  especially  for  males  at  the  low  end  of  the  skill 
distribution. Although family networks define in a direct way the connection between 
network members they are more specific and refer to a subset of the potential social 
interactions that might be relevant.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
3.1 Data 
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) between 1992 and 
2003.  The  BHPS  is  a  representative  sample  of  British  households  which  follows 
individuals over time, allowing identification of yearly transitions across labor market 
states. In addition to this, the BHPS contains a special section on social networks, 
which we exploit for estimating network effects on job finding rates. Starting from 
wave  2  (1992),  respondents  were  asked  at  each  even-numbered  wave  to  report 
                                                            
6 Van der Klaauw and van Ours (2003) use neighborhoods to study the effect of networks in the context 
of welfare transitions. Welfare dependency and social networks are also studied by Bertrand et al. 
(2000).   7 
information on their three best friends. Besides details about best friends’ gender and 
age, the BHPS provides information on the employment status of friends. Therefore, 
we can observe that part of the network closest to the BHPS respondent (the three best 
friends), and we are able to characterize the employment intensity within that portion.  
Since information on friends is retrieved at every even-numbered wave, we are 
able  to  relate  the  employment  status  of  friends  at  wave  t 
( 1992,1994,1996,...,2002) t =   to  the  employment  transitions  of  BHPS  respondents 
between waves  t and  1 t + . We select a sample of individuals aged 18-65 and not in 
full time education at any even-numbered wave whose three best friends also belong 
to the same age range. This results in 10,911 individual observations (5,296 men and 
5,615 women) with a total of 36,610 person-year observations. Since our focus is on 
yearly  transitions  from  non-employment  into  employment  (including  self-
employment) from one year to the next, we further select individuals who are not 
employed in the survey year and whose employment status in the subsequent year is 
observed. Finally, we exclude individuals who do not report information on all three 
friends.
7 Our final estimating sample consists of 3,196 non-employed individuals with 
a total of 6,479 person-year observations. Half of the individuals are observed as non-
employed more than once in the sample.  
  
Some relevant demographic information for the estimating sample is presented 
in Panel A of Table 1, in connection with the demographic characteristics of the three 
best friends. The table shows that there is a certain extent of assortative mating among 
friends in terms of both gender and age. The proportion of women whose first best 
friend is a woman is 83 percent, and a similar incidence (81 percent) characterizes 
men. As we move from the first to the third best friends, assortative mating remains   8 
high among women (79 percent have the third best friend who is of the same gender), 
while it decreases somehow more evidently for men, where the proportion of cases 
whose third best friend is men is 71 percent. We can observe patterns of assortative 
mating among friends also in the case of age, where the average age of friends grows 
with the age of the respondent. Note, however, that we have truncated the distribution 
of  friends’  age  between  18  and  65,  which  explains  why  the  ordering  between 
respondents and their friends’ ages reverts as we consider older respondents in our 
sample.  
In Panel B of Table 1 we provide some summary statistics on the job finding 
probabilities in the sample. On average, about 20 percent of non-employed individuals 
make a transition from non-employment to employment from one year to another.
8 
The lower part of Table 1 provides evidence on the association between the number of 
employed individuals in the group of the three best friends and transitions from non-
employment to employment. As can be seen, the association is strong, with the exit 
rate from non-employment that more than triples when moving from zero to three 
employed friends. Moreover, patterns appear to be rather similar for women and men. 
  
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We model the associations singled out in Table 1 by means of regression models for 
the probability of transitions from non-employment into employment.  
Let  it E  be a dummy indicator of respondent’s  i employment status in year  t, 
and let  it NEF  denote the number of employed friends of individual  i in year  t, a 
variable that can take values from 0 to 3. The employment dummy takes on value one 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7  In  Section  4.3  we  investigate  the  sensitivity  to  the  exclusion  of  those  individuals  with  missing 
information on their friends.    9 
for  respondents  that  are  either  full-time  employees,  part-time  employees  or  self-
employed, and value zero for those who are either unemployed (ILO definition) or out 
of the labor force. Our baseline specification is 
'
, 1 , , 1 , Pr( | 0) ( ) i t i t i t i t i E E F X NEF u β δ + = = + +      (1) 
where  , i t X  is a vector of controls. The vector of individual characteristics includes 
time-varying and time-invariant regressors. The time-varying regressors include the 
local unemployment rate defined at the travel-to-work area level, age and dummies 
for the region of residence, the survey year, living as a couple, having one, two or 
more children, experiencing health problems, depression and being a smoker. The 
time-invariant regressors include a gender dummy, education (highest qualification 
attained)  and  ethnicity  (categorized  in  nine  groups)  dummies.  We  also  include  in 
vector  X  the individual characteristics of each of the three friends for which we have 
information; age and gender.  
We  estimate  the  transition  equation  in  (1)  by  forming  a  sample  of  non-
employed  individuals  at  each  even  wave  (t=1992,  1994,  1996,…,  2002).  For 
estimation we adopt a fixed effect logit approach, which eliminates the unobserved 
effect  i u ,  which  is  fixed  over  time.  In  our  sample,  we  observe  multiple  non-
employment spells for each individual with the number of employed friends varying 
over  time  and  across  these  spells.  We  use  this  variation  to  control  for  individual 
unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with the main variable of interest, 
the  number  of  employed  friends.  The  sample  size  is  reduced  substantially  due  to 
conditioning on those individuals who are observed  with multiple spells and with 
transitions from non-employment to employment over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 The year-to-year job finding rate is much higher for the unemployed (42 percent) and lower for the 
inactive (15 percent).   10
The  presence  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  induces  serial  correlation  in  the 
employment process, which may imply that sample selection is endogenous. Note, 
however,  that  we  integrate  out  time-invariant  unobserved  heterogeneity  using  the 
fixed  effect  logit  estimator.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  those  found  out  of 
employment in a given year have an unobserved propensity to find a job that is lower 
than the average in the population, any remaining bias is likely to produce attenuation 
in the effect under estimation. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Empirical Correlations 
We first present some regression-based correlations between the number of employed 
friends and the transition into employment to have a benchmark for comparison with 
the fixed effect estimates that follow. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the estimates of a 
pooled  logit  regression  without  additional  controls.  We  find  that  the  number  of 
employed  friends  exhibits  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  the  transition  into 
employment. The marginal effect suggests that having an additional employed friend 
increases the job finding probability by 6.4 percentage points (p.p).
9 In Columns 2 and 
3  we  investigate  the  sensitivity  of  this  finding  to  the  inclusion  of  individual  and 
friends’ characteristics. With the inclusion of friends’ characteristics (age and gender) 
the marginal effect reduces to 5.9 p.p and after controlling for individual observed 
characteristics, the marginal effect becomes 6.0 p.p. This suggests that only a small 
part of the effect is due to a correlation between the number of employed friends and 
observed characteristics. Taking into account the unconditional job finding rate of 
20.28 percent, the effect of an additional employed friend is sizeable and corresponds   11
to  approximately  a  33  percent  increase.  Estimating  the  same  pooled  logit  model 
separately  for  the  unemployed  and  inactive,  we  find  that  an  additional  employed 
friend increases the job finding rate by 7.0 p.p. for the unemployed and by 5.0 p.p. for 
the inactive. 
Non-linear effects − The above analysis imposes a linearity assumption on the 
effect of the number of employed friends. We next estimate the pooled probit model 
allowing for a non-linear effect by defining dummies for having one, two or three 
employed friends. The results presented in Column 4 of Table 2 show that having one 
employed friend significantly increases the probability to enter employment in the 
next year by 6.2 p.p compared to having no employed friends, while having two or 
three employed friends increases the job finding probability by 10.3 p.p and 18.1 p.p, 
respectively.  We  also  experimented  with  quadratic  trends  and  with  specifications 
accounting  for  the  effect  of  one  additional  employed  friend,  and  found  no  clear 
evidence of convexities in the network effect. 
 
4.2 Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity 
The  results  presented  so  far  establish  the  existence  of  a  correlation  between  the 
employment status of friends. Non-employed individuals who have more employed 
friends are more likely to find a job. One concern with this finding is that unobserved 
individual characteristics might affect both the probability of having friends who are 
employed and their own probability of becoming employed. For instance, individuals 
who are more attached to the labor market might have a higher propensity to find a 
job and at the same time have friends who are more likely to be employed. This would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Marginal effects for both the pooled logit and the fixed effect logit of the next section are computed as 
(1 ) nef p p β − , where 
nef β  is the estimated coefficient on the number of friends, while p is the average 
sample predicted probability. 
   12
lead to an upward bias on the effect of the number of employed friends. As discussed 
in Section 3, we address this by estimating equation (1) using a fixed effect logit 
approach. 
The first column of the top panel (FE-1) of Table 3 shows that even after 
controlling  for  fixed  effects  the  coefficient  of  the  number  of  employed  friends 
indicates a positive and significant effect on job finding probability. An additional 
employed friend increases the transition probability by 3.7 p.p. This effect is lower 
compared  to  the  pooled  estimation,  which  suggests  a  positive  correlation  between 
unobserved individual heterogeneity and having employed friends, which leads to an 
upward bias. Nevertheless, the effect remains significant and large. This finding is 
consistent with the core prediction from the theoretical literature that the better the 
employment status of an individual’s connections, the better his or her employment 
prospects (Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004;  Bramoullé 
and Saint-Paul, 2009; Galeotti and Merlino, 2010). 
The non-linear specification of the FE-1 estimation in the lower panel of Table 
3 shows that the effect is higher − and significant − when all friends are employed. 
This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  predictions  of  Calvó-Armengol  and 
Jackson (2004), according to which, more employed contacts reduce the competition 
within the network, so we should expect a larger effect. To the contrary, when the 
network has more unemployed friends, then any new information about job vacancies 
that might arrive is more likely to be kept by the individual who receives it and less 
likely to be passed on to other members of the network. 
The  fixed  effect  estimation  (FE-1)  assumes  that  only  fixed  unobserved 
individual characteristics can be correlated with the employment status of friends. It 
could be the case, however, that time-varying characteristics might change when one   13
enters  non-employment  and  this  change  might  be  correlated  with  friends’ 
characteristics. For instance, it is possible that behavior such as smoking, drinking or 
depression might change upon entering non-employment, which might also affect the 
friendship  ties  of  the  unemployed.  In  order  to  test  for  the  presence  of  such  a 
correlation, we estimate our model by excluding all the time-varying covariates (FE-
2).  Our  maintained  assumption  is  that  if  observed  and  unobserved  time-varying 
heterogeneity are correlated, then finding that our estimates are not sensitive to time-
varying regressors would signal that they are also likely to be robust to time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity. The second column of Table 3 shows that after excluding 
all  the  time-varying  regressors  the  fixed-effect  estimate  is  very  similar  (marginal 
effect of 3.8) with the one that includes the time-varying regressors (marginal effect 
of 3.7). 
 
4.3 Robustness Analysis 
We investigate the robustness of our main results to a number of additional issues. 
First, correlation in unobservables may arise not only due to individual unobserved 
characteristics but also because of the presence of local economic shocks that might 
affect both the number of employed friends and the job finding probability. Second, 
we consider the situation in which the network is endogenous, so that the composition 
of the network may change in response to individual’s labor market status. Finally, we 
check  the  sensitivity  of  our  findings  with  respect  to  the  missing  information  on 
friends, and the inclusion of the length of the spell. 
Local economic conditions – Starting with the local economic conditions we 
consider their importance for our findings in two ways. First, we estimate our baseline 
model excluding the local unemployment rate, which is defined at the travel-to-work   14
area. The coefficient estimate from FE-3 in Table 3 remains the same compared to the 
main specification (FE-1), which suggests that our main finding is not sensitive to the 
local economic conditions. Second, we estimate our baseline model including, as an 
additional control, the percentage of benefit claimants by occupation and region. The 
idea is that individuals who work in the same occupation as their friends are more 
likely to be subject to correlated shocks that might not be completely captured by an 
aggregate  local  unemployment  rate.  The  percentage  of  benefit  claimants  by 
occupation in the region of residence captures those local occupational specific shocks 
that might affect members of the same network. We only have this information for the 
years 1996-2000, so we perform this estimation with the relevant sub-sample. Due to 
the reduced sample size, we are not able to estimate the model with fixed effects. 
Based on the estimation on the pooled sample, we find that after controlling for the 
percent of benefit claimants, the marginal effect of the number of employed friends on 
the sub-sample of observations within 1996-2000 remains unchanged at 0.04 (4 p.p). 
Endogenous networks – The estimation of the fixed effects model relies on 
variation over time of the employment status of friends, assuming no feedback effects. 
This rules out the case of a feedback from being non-employed to the number of 
employed  friends,  which  might  arise  if,  for  example,  staying  longer  out  of 
employment leads to fewer contacts with employed people. In addition, given that our 
sample is based on the stock of non-employed at time t with differences in the length 
of elapsed duration, this feedback might lead to dynamic selection with those having a 
shorter  duration  also  having  more  employed  friends.  This  type  of  selection  might 
result  in  a  spurious  correlation  between  the  number  of  employed  friends  and  job 
finding rates as those with shorter duration in non-employment are also more likely to 
find a job.   15
Starting from the possible selection due to stock-sampling, we examine the 
effect of the elapsed duration in non-employment on the number of employed friends. 
Although  this  does  not  address  selection  in  a  regression  framework,  it  provides 
evidence as to whether those with longer non-employment spells have systematically 
fewer employed friends. Given the panel structure of our data, we estimate a linear 
fixed effects model, which eliminates the unobserved individual characteristics that 
might be correlated with both the number of employed friends and the length of time 
in  non-employment.  The  top  panel  of  Table  4  shows  that  the  elapsed  duration  in 
months in non-employment is not statistically significant in explaining the number of 
employed friends. This provides sufficient evidence that our sample is not selected in 
way that might lead to a spurious relation between number of employed friends and 
job finding rates.
10 We also investigate the sensitivity of our estimates from equation 
(1) to the inclusion of the length of time in the current labor market state for the 
sample of non-employed. The estimation FE-4 in Table 3 shows that controlling for 
the length out of employment increases the marginal effect from 0.037 to 0.042. This 
suggests that any correlation between the length of time in non-employment and the 
number of employed friends is likely to lead to a downward bias. 
We also estimate equation (1) using lag values of the number of employed 
friends. If feedback effects from non-employment spells may induce depletion in the 
stock of friends in the base year of a transition, using the number of employed friends 
in the year before provides a measure of networks that is less prone to this type of 
effect. The coefficient estimate from the fixed effect logit in the second panel of Table 
4 using the lag number of employed friends is larger compared to the estimate from 
Table 3 (FE-1), which refers to the current number of friends. The estimated marginal 
                                                            
10 The OLS result (not reported) is negative and significantly different from zero, which suggests that 
any correlation is due to unobserved characteristics.   16
effect is 6.3 p.p. (3.7 p.p. in Table 3), which suggests that our main estimates from 
Table 3 can again be seen as a lower bound of the effect of networks on job finding 
rates. 
Missing friends – Finally, we check the sensitivity of our main findings to the 
missing information on friends. Every individual in the survey is asked to provide 
information on his or her three best friends; but not everyone reports information on 
all  their  friends.  Considering  the  sample  which  includes  those  with  missing 
information on their friends, we include dummy variables by the type of information 
that is missing for each friend as  additional controls. The last column in Table 3 
shows that main effect of the number of employed friends is unchanged when we 
consider this larger sample. The marginal effect is slightly larger (0.041 instead of 
0.037 of FE-1) and is statistically significant. 
 
4.4. Labor market outcomes 
Given  the  panel  dimension  of  our  data,  we  are  able  to  investigate  the  effect  of 
networks  on  labor  market  outcomes  for  those  who  find  a  job.  We  consider  re-
employment wages and the stability in employment by modeling the probability of 
exiting from employment back to non-employment over the next year.  
Column  1  in  Table  5  shows  that  the  number  of  employed  friends  has  a 
significant  and  positive  effect  on  re-employment  wages.  An  additional  employed 
friend  increases  wages  for  those  who  become  employed  in  the  next  year  by  6.2 
percent. In addition, having one (three) employed friend(s) compared to having no 
employed  friends  increases  wages  by  11.6  (22.2)  percent.  The  second  column  of 
Table 5 shows that an additional employed friend not only increases wages but also 
reduces the probability to exit subsequent employment by 5.1 p.p. As shown in the 
lower panel of Table 5, having one friend does not lead to a significant difference in   17
exit rates, but those who have two or three friends employed compared to none are 
significantly  more  likely  to  remain  employed.  While  both  these  results  suggest 
positive network effects on labor market outcomes one has to view them with some 
caution as those who find a job might be positively selected among the non-employed. 
 
5. Discussion  
There are a number of potential mechanisms through which employed friends might 
affect  job  finding  probabilities.  The  first  mechanism  is  related  to  information 
transmission of available jobs from the employed to the non-employed contacts of the 
network (e.g. Calvό-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Bramoullé and Saint-Paul, 2009). 
The  second  is  related  to  peer-effects  and  social  norms.  Social  norms  might  exert 
pressure on the unemployed workers to find a job. Stutzer and Lalive (2004) provide 
evidence that social norms (‘worth ethic’) speed up transitions out of unemployment. 
To the extent that the relevant social group is formed by the best friends, our findings 
may  reflect  the  pressure  that  employed  friends  exert  on  non-employed  network 
members.  A  third  mechanism  that  might  explain  the  findings  is  leisure 
complementarities. When the friends of an unemployed person are all employed, this 
will lower the value of leisure if enjoying leisure requires the presence of others, 
which might lower the reservation wage. Jenkins and Osberg (2004) show the effect 
of leisure coordination on the happiness of couples.  
As  a  way  to  assess  the  relevance  of  peer-pressure  and  leisure 
complementarities as explanations of our findings, we exploit data on life satisfaction 
and satisfaction with the use of leisure, which are available in the BHPS. If non-
employed individuals experience pressure from having all their friends employed or 
derive disutility from the fact that they have ‘nobody to play with’ when they have   18
time free from market work, we should expect a negative association between the 
number of employed friends and satisfaction with life in general and leisure. We can 
actually  estimate  these  associations  by  regressing  life  satisfaction  and  satisfaction 
with  leisure  of  the  non-employed  on  the  number  of  their  employed  friends.  The 
findings in Table 6 – both for the OLS and FE estimations – suggest that the number 
of employed friends does not have any effect on either measures of satisfaction.  
In addition, for both the peer-effect and leisure complementarity hypotheses, 
we expect a lower reservation wage when the number of employed friends is higher. 
In fact, according to both interpretations, employed friends make non-employment 
spells more painful, so that non-employed network members should try to speed up 
the exit from non-employment, which can be done by lowering reservation wages and 
increasing search effort. In turn, lower reservation wages should correspond to lower 
wages upon re-employment. Conversely, the information hypothesis would suggest 
that the number of employed friends should lead to better employment opportunities 
and higher wages, to the extent that networks convey superior information on job 
offers relative to alternative job search channels.
11 The evidence that the number of 
employed friends increases wages and the stability in employment that we provided in 




This  paper  investigates  the  effect  of  social  interactions  on  labor  market  outcomes 
using a direct measure of social contacts based on individuals’ best friends and their 
characteristics. Using data from the BHPS, we identify the effect of social networks   19
by examining the effect of the number of employed friends on the transition from 
non-employment to employment. We provide evidence that employed friends increase 
the  probability  of  finding  a  job.  An  additional  employed  friend  increases  the 
probability of finding a job by 3.7 percentage points, which is a sizeable effect. In 
addition, having all friends employed compared to no employed friends leads to the 
greatest effects. These results are robust to a number of specifications that address the 
potential  endogeneity  of  the  number  of  employed  friends  due  to  correlated 
unobservables and feedback effects.   
We also investigate the potential mechanisms through which employed friends 
might  affect  job  finding  probabilities,  considering  three  mechanisms:  information 
transmission,  peer-effects  or  social  norms,  and  leisure  complementarities.  To 
distinguish between these different channels, we consider the relation of the number 
of employed friends with wages, subsequent employment stability and satisfaction 
with life and leisure. We find that having more employed friends is associated with 
wage gains and more stable employment, while there is no effect on satisfaction. We 
interpret this as evidence of the information transmission mechanism through which 
social networks operate. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) show in a calibrated matching model with random social network 
that on average workers who are better connected socially experience lower unemployment rates and 
receive higher wages.   20
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
Panel a): Demographic characteristics of sample respondents and their three best friends
Own Characteristics
Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman
Man 81.16 18.84 75.66 24.34 71.6 28.4
Woman 16.94 83.06 16.26 83.74 20.78 79.22
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
18 to 24 23.49 7.44 23.38 7.23 23.42 7.14
25 to 29 30.57 9.17 30.3 8.56 29.57 7.78
30 to 34 34.7 8.81 34.04 8.27 33.76 8.44
35 to 39 38.21 8.18 37.38 7.88 37.28 8.18
40 to 44 41.87 7.95 40.81 7.76 40.9 8.03
45 to 49 44.66 8.04 43.59 8.52 43.54 8.86
50 to 54 47.1 9.6 47.16 10.01 46.61 10.23
55 to 65 51.3 10.52 50.01 11.09 49.55 10.86



























First Best Friend Second Best Friend Third Best Friend
 
Notes: The sample consists of non-employed individuals in the even years between 1992-2003 for 
which information on friends is observed. 
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Table 2: Pooled Sample Estimates. 
Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio
Number of Employed Friends 0.399 0.064 10.86 0.367 0.059 9.67 0.373 0.060 9.16
One Employed Friend 0.384 0.062 2.53
Two Employed Friends 0.639 0.103 4.35






















(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Notes: Logit regressions for the transition from non-employment to employment. Coefficients, marginal effects and their t-ratio are reported. The 
sample consists of non-employed individuals in the even years between 1992-2003 for which information on friends is observed. Other regressors 
include individual and friend time-varying covariates (age, dummies for living as a couple, number of children (1, 2 or more), having health problems, 
experiencing depression, smoking, time and region dummies, and age of each friend), individual and friend time-invariant covariates (dummies for 
female for individual and each of his or her friends, dummies for levels of education, ethnicity) and local economic conditions (local unemployment 
rate at travel-to-work area). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The full specification is reported in Table A1.   26 
Table 3: Fixed Effect Estimates. 
Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio
Number of Employed Friends 0.166 0.037 2.04 0.171 0.038 2.10 0.166 0.037 2.04 0.188 0.042 2.26 0.191 0.041 2.57
Log-Likelihood
Number of Observations
Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio
One Employed Friend 0.371 0.082 1.39 0.389 0.086 1.46 0.371 0.082 1.39 0.388 0.086 1.42 0.347 0.074 1.63
Two Employed Friends 0.357 0.079 1.35 0.383 0.085 1.45 0.360 0.080 1.36 0.411 0.091 1.52 0.382 0.081 1.72
























Notes: Fixed effect regressions for the transition from non-employment to employment. Other regressors include individual and friend time-varying covariates 
(age, local unemployment rate at travel-to-work area, dummies for living as a couple, number of children (1, 2 or more), having health problems, experiencing 
depression, smoking, time dummies, and age of each friend. FE-1 is the main specification with the full set of covariates and FE-2 is estimated without individual 
time-varyimg covariates. FE-3 is estimated without the local unemployment rate.  Estimation FE-4 includes a control for the length of the non-employment spell. 
Estimation FE-5 is based on the sample of individuals which includes those who have missing information on their friends. Dummy variables defined by the type 
of information missing are included as additional regressors. The full specification of FE-1 is reported in Table A1.   27
Table 4: Endogenous Network. 
Dependent Variable:
Number of Employed Friends
Coef.






Lag Number of Employed Friends 0.276 0.063 2.57







Note: The top panel reports the coefficient estimate of the linear fixed-
effects regression of the number of employed friends on the duration in 
non-employment. The second panel reports the estimate of the conditional 
fixed-effects  regression  of  the  probability  of  finding  a  job  on  the  lag 
number  of  employed  friends.  Both  estimations  include  all  the  other 
controls. 
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Table 5. Labor Market Outcomes. 
Coef. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio
Number of Employed Friends 0.062 4.10 -0.350 -0.051 -3.58
Number of Observations
Coef. t-ratio Coef. M.E. t-ratio
One Employed Friend 0.116 2.04 -0.316 -0.046 -0.89
Two Employed Friends 0.201 3.76 -0.632 -0.093 -1.84
Three Employed Friends 0.222 4.20 -1.034 -0.152 -2.86







Notes: The estimation in the first column is a linear regression of log wages for the sample of those who make a 
transition from non-employment to employment. The estimation in the second column is a logit regression for 
the probability to exit from employment in the following year for the sample of those who make a transition 
from non-employment to employment. 29
  Table 6. Life and Leisure Satisfaction. 
Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Number of Employed Friends -0.011 -0.45 0.012 0.42 0.000 0.00 -0.009 -0.24
Number of Individuals
Number of Observations
Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
One Employed Friend -0.034 -0.40 -0.154 -1.87 -0.065 -0.64 -0.035 -0.34
Two Employed Friends -0.071 -0.86 -0.035 -0.42 -0.068 -0.69 -0.020 -0.19








Leis. Sat. - OLS
4,116
Life Sat. - FE
4,117
4,116 4,116
Life Sat. - OLS Leis. Sat. - FE Life Sat. - FE Leis. Sat. - OLS
4,117
4,116 4,117
Life Sat. - OLS Leis. Sat. - FE
 
Notes:  Linear  and  fixed-effects  regressions.  The  dependent  variable  is  life  satisfaction  (Life  Sat.)  and  leisure 
satisfaction (Leis. Sat.). Other regressors include the ones reported in the first column of Table 1. 30
  Table A1. Full Specification Estimates 
Coef. S.Error t-ratio Coef. S.Error t-ratio
Number of Employed Friends 0.373 0.041 9.16 0.166 0.082 2.04
Individual Characteristics
Female -0.598 0.137 -4.38
Age -0.068 0.005 -13.21 0.060 0.303 0.20
Having Health Problems -0.360 0.076 -4.73 -0.154 0.172 -0.90
Experiencing Depression -0.528 0.131 -4.02 -0.586 0.256 -2.29
Smoking 0.008 0.085 0.09 0.064 0.277 0.23
Family Characteristics
In Couple 0.221 0.096 2.29 0.290 0.254 1.14
One Child -0.151 0.111 -1.36 -0.146 0.277 -0.52
Two Children -0.156 0.109 -1.44 -0.018 0.301 -0.06
Three or more Children -0.447 0.130 -3.43 -0.186 0.369 -0.50
Level of Education
Other Qualifications 0.383 0.142 2.69
O-Level 0.259 0.125 2.08
A-Level 0.476 0.143 3.33
Other Higher Education 0.727 0.121 6.01
University Degree 0.990 0.153 6.46
Regions
Inner London -0.910 0.496 -1.84
Outer London -0.629 0.478 -1.32
Rest of South East -0.343 0.450 -0.76
South West -0.386 0.460 -0.84
East Anglia -0.412 0.472 -0.87
East Midlands -0.611 0.453 -1.35
West Midlands Conurbation -0.679 0.488 -1.39
Rest of West Midlands -0.565 0.473 -1.19
Greater Manchester -0.494 0.489 -1.01
Merseyside -1.378 0.522 -2.64
Rest of North West -0.674 0.477 -1.41
South Yorkshire -0.920 0.506 -1.82
West Yorkshire -0.886 0.482 -1.84
Rest of Yorkshire -0.513 0.481 -1.07
Tyne and Wear -0.884 0.504 -1.75
Rest of North -0.558 0.475 -1.18
Wales -0.611 0.467 -1.31
Scotland -0.542 0.464 -1.17




White -1.310 1.458 -0.90
Black Carribean -1.672 1.560 -1.07
Black African -1.355 1.586 -0.85
Black Other -0.426 1.694 -0.25
Indian -1.280 1.500 -0.85
Pakistani -2.337 1.572 -1.49
Bangladeshi -2.066 1.603 -1.29
Other -1.292 1.553 -0.83
Local Unemployment Rate -0.025 0.015 -1.66 0.026 0.070 0.37
w4 0.072 0.116 0.63 0.426 0.640 0.67
w6 -0.142 0.158 -0.90 0.452 1.250 0.36
w8 -0.190 0.200 -0.95 0.493 1.868 0.26
w10 -0.030 0.212 -0.14 0.357 2.465 0.14
w12 -0.216 0.225 -0.96 -0.225 3.067 -0.07
w14 -0.207 0.233 -0.89 -0.116 3.666 -0.03
Friends’ Characteristics
Age of Friend 1 0.006 0.004 1.64 0.015 0.008 1.87
Age of Friend 2 0.001 0.004 0.24 0.007 0.008 0.78
Age of Friend 3 -0.001 0.004 -0.17 0.005 0.008 0.65
Friend 1 - Male 0.044 0.101 0.43
Friend 2 - Male -0.162 0.095 -1.71
Friend 3 - Male -0.165 0.086 -1.92
Constant 2.842 1.557 1.83
Log-Likelihood
Number of Individuals






Notes: The pooled logit estimation refers to the estimation in the third column of Table 
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